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LAW AND PRACTICE IN PROBATION AND PAROLE REVOCATION HEARINGS*
RONALD B. SKLAR
Mr. Sklar is Instructor in the Brooklyn Law School. He received the B.S. degree in 1957 from New
York University, the LL.B. degree in 1961 from the Brooklyn Law School, and the LL.M. degree
in 1962 from the Northwestern University School of Law. Mr. Sklar studied at Northwestern as a
Ford Foundation Fellow in Criminal Law.
In the following article, Mr. Sklar documents the federal and state law applicable to procedures
for the revocation of probation and parole, as developed in both legislation and judicial decisions.
In addition, he presents the results of a survey which he conducted to ascertain federal and state
practice with regard to probation and parole revocation. Against this background, Mr. Sklar analyses
the various constitutional and policy considerations which must be weighed in order to evaluate
current law and practice and presents his own appraisal of the shortcomings of present revocation
procedures.-EDXTOe.
The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules
recently proposed a new subdivision (f) to Rule 32
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
"Revocation of Probation. The court shall
not revoke probation except after a hearing at
which the defendant shall be present and ap-
prised of the grounds on which such action is
proposed."
This new provision, as the Committee observes
in its Note to Rule 32, is intended to replace that
portion of 18 U.S.C. §3653 which provides that
upon arrest for a suspected violation of probation,
a probationer "shall be taken before the court"
and his probation revoked, or, as the case may be,
modified or continued. The net result of the new
amendment, again as observed by the Committee,
would be to codify the decision of Escoe v. Zerbst,l
in which the United States Supreme Court con-
strued the statute's direction that the probationer
"shall be taken before the court" to require that
an informal hearing be held with the probationer
present before probation is revoked.
2
* This article is adapted from the author's master's
thesis entitled "The Revocation of Parole and Adult
Probation," May 1962 (Northwestern University Law
Library).
1295 U.S. 490 (1935).2The hearing, said the Court, is to be "so fitted in
its range to the needs of the occasion as to justify the
conclusion that discretion has not been abused by the
failure of the inquisitor to carry the probe deeper."
Id. at 493. In the earlier case of Burns v. United
States, 287 U.S. 216, 222, 223 (1932), the Court had
said that the question in the case of the revocation of
Although the Committee's proposal, therefore,
would add nothing new to the present state of the
law regarding the revocation of probation in
federal courts, it represents an improvement over
state legislation in specifying that a "hearing"
must be held. In many states the statutes contain
no indication as to whether a hearing is or is not
required. Such legislative passivity concerning
this important phase of the probation and parole
process would be censurable under any circum-
stances; it is all the more extraordinary today
when one considers the emphasis of recent years
on the punishment and rehabilitation stage of the
criminal law.
It is not a little discouraging to note that in the
parole revocation field the number of states lack-
ing legislation concerning the presence or absence
of a hearing, as a group, outnumbers all other
categories into which the states may be placed.
More specifically, 16 jurisdictions have no perti-
nent legislation, 3 as compared, for instance, with
nine jurisdictions which specify that no hearing is
required and 14 jurisdictions which specify, with-
out further elaboration, that a "hearing" is re-
quired before parole may be formally revoked.
probation "is not one of formal procedure either with
respect to notice or specification of charges or a trial
upon charges," but that the probationer is neverthe-
less "entitled to fair treatment."
3Note that in each of these jurisdictions there are
statutes which govern the revocation procedure, but
they are silent on the hearing question.
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Eight jurisdictions in the probation revocation
field are guilty of this kind of legislative oversight.
In those jurisdictions, and there are many,
where the pertinent statute compels the revoking
authority-usually a court in the case of proba-
tion, ari'administrative body in the case of parole-
to hold some kind of hearing on the violation
charges, the statute may simply require a "hear-
ing," or may direct that the hearing be "sum-
mary"-or "informal" in nature, or may, instead,
specify in more or less detail the nature of the
hearing to be held. For the most part, however,
the statutes in the area do not elaborate on the
scope and depth-the "quality"-of the hearing,
but deal instead with the broader question of
whether or not hearings are required. Judicial
opinions ordinarily concern themselves with the
same basic problem, leaving to the revoking
authority the task of formulating the procedures
before it.
State and federal cases do exist where the court,








that a hearing be held, has strived to set some
ground rules for the hearing, struggling in this
endeavor with basic constitutional and policy
issues, more often with the former.
When statutes or court decisions make some
kind of hearing mandatory, it remains basically
within the province of the revoking authority to
prescribe the type of hearing to be held. This is
particularly the case where the law in the juris-
diction has not proceeded beyond the bare direc-
tion that a hearing be held. Moreover, even where
the applicable statute or decisional law authorizes
revocation without a hearing, it is, of course, still
within the power of a trial court or parole board
to grant, as a matter of practice, some kind of
hearing before taking action on the charges.
THE STATUTES
The statutes throughout the country in the
probation and parole revocation field may be
grouped, generally speaking, into one of six cate-
gories. These will be presented in chart form.
STATUTES EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZING REVOCATION WITHOUT A HEARING
PROBATION
Statutes Comments
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §4321 Process issued for probationer's arrest "and thereupon,
(1953). without any further proceeding" sentence is imposed.
Separate statute for Wilmington Municipal Court,
having misdemeanor and city ordinance jurisdiction,
categorized below.
IOWA CODE ANN. §247.26 Probation may be revoked "without notice" to pro-
(1949). bationer.
Mo. ANN. STATS. §549.101 Court "may in its discretion with or without a hearing"
(1963 Supp.). revoke probation. This statute, enacted in 1963,
seemingly repeals §549.254 which required an "in-
formal" hearing. See Revisor's Notes to §549.254.
OKLA. STATS. ANN. tit. 22, Probationer arrested and "delivered forthwith" to the




CAL. PENAL CODE §3060 Revoking authority may "revoke any parole without
(1956). notice, and.., order returned to prison" any parolee.
In four of the states listed in this category-Colo-
rado, North Carolina, Oregon, and South Dakota-the
statute, while not expressly negating a hearing, sets
up an ex parte revocation and commitment procedure.
That is, the parolee is taken into custody pursuant to
order of the revoking authority and reimprisoned in
the institution from which he was paroled, without
any appearance before the authority. No provision is
made for a hearing after commitment. Since a hearing
is not expressly denied, these statutes might have been
included among those which are silent on the hearing
question. The line of demarcation is uncertain. How-
ever, their ex parte language has impelled the writer
to include them in the present category. The statute
of a fifth state in this group, North Dakota, interest-
ingly enough, provides for a "full hearing" on any
parole violation charge. However, following the hear-
ing the board then orders the parolee taken into "ac-
tual custody," which order is to be executed by a peace
officer and the parolee upon apprehension delivered to
the warden of the penitentiary for recommitment. It
is clear, therefore, that the "hearing" contemplated by
the statute is ex parte which, for purposes of this paper,
is no hearing at all.
[Vol. 55













COLO. REV. STATS. ANN. §39-
17-6 (1961 Supp.).
N.J. STATs. ANN. §§30:4-
123.22, 30:4-123.23 (1963
Supp.).
N.C. GEN. STATS. §148-61.1
(1958).
N.D. CENT. CODE §12-59-15
(1963 Supp.).
OK.LA. STATS. ANN. tit. 57, §346
(1950).
ORE. REV. STATS. §§144.340-
144.370 (1961).
R.I. GEtc. LAws §13-8-18
(1956).
S.D. CODE §13.5307 (1960).
Comments
See footnote 4.
Prior to revoking parole, the board "may, in accordance
with its rules, permit [the parolee] an opportunity
to appear before the board and show cause why his
parole should not be revoked" (emphasis added).
See footnote 4.
See footnote 4.
Parolee may be "rearrested and recommitted vithout
any further proceedings."
See footnote 4.
Board "may... revoke with or %vithout a hearng."
See footnote 4 (revocation by Governor).














ARIZ. REv. STATS. §13-1657
(B) (19 57).
6
ARuc. STATS. ANN. §43-2324
(1963 Supp.).
CAL. PENAL CODE §§1203.2,
1203.3 (1963 Supp.).
D.C. CODE §24-104 (1961).
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, §3
(1956).
NEB. REV. STATS. §29-2219(3)
(1956).
S.D. CODE §34.3708-2 (1960).








6 As indicated in the "comment" column, the board
in New Jersey "may" but is not required to hold a
hearing. If a hearing is held, however, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§30:4-123.25 provides that the parolee "shall have
the right to consult legal counsel of his own selection"
and, if the board consents, may submit a "brief or
other legal argument on his behalf to the parole board."
6 Arizona's statute is typical. It reads, in part: "The
court may, in its discretion, issue a warrant for the re-
arrest of any probationer and may thereupon revoke
and terminate the probation."
7 Several of the statutes in this category, it must be
admitted, have an ex parte revocation "flavor." As
observed in note 4 supra, the line dividing this cate-
gory from the preceding one is not certain. The stat-
utes considered here, however, are not as detailed as
the statutes discussed in note 4, with some few excep-
tions. The Iowa statute is more or less typical: "All
paroled prisoners shall remain, while on parole, in the
legal custody of the warden or superintendent and
under the control of [the] board, and shall be subject,
at any time, to be taken into custody and returned to
the institution from which they were paroled." The
phrase "subject at any time to be returned to the in-
stitution" appears, in substance, in the statutes of Il-
linois, Minnesota, Nevada, South Carolina, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming. The statutes of Connecticut and Ne-
braska, although not referring to a hearing one way or
the other, specify that the parolee may be reimprisoned
"for any reason that seems sufficient to said board"




















STATUTES WICH IMPLY THAT A HEARING Is To BE HELD
PROBATION8
State Statutes
United States 18 U.S.C. §3653 (1951).
Alaska ALASKA STATS. §33.05.070(b)
(1962).
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §4346
(1953).
Kentucky Ky. REV. STATS. §439.300(1)
(1963).
Mississippi MIsS. CODE ANN. §4004-25
(1956).
Nevada NEv. REV. STATS. §176.330
(1960).
Pennsylvania PA. STATS. ANN. tit. 19, §1084
(1930).
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS §§12-19-9,
12-19-14 (1956).
Virginia VA. CODE §53-275 (1958).
8 These statutes require for the most part that the
probationer be "brought before the court" and his
probation revoked. The leading case construing such a
Comments
Wilmington Municipal Court only. See category I
above.
§439.300(3) provides that probation may be revoked
"without a hearing" if the probationer has been
convicted of a subsequent crime.
phrase as a direction that some kind of hearing be held





CONN. GEN. STATS. §54-126 See footnote 7.
(1960).
IDAHO CODE §§20-216, 20-228, Cf. §20-229.
20-231 (1947).
ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 38, §§123- See footnote 7.
3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1964), 807
(1962 Supp.).
IOWA CODE ANN. §247.9 (1949). See footnote 7.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 127, §149
(1957).
MiN. STATS. ANN. §243.05 See footnote 7.
(1963 Supp.).
NEB. REV. STATS. §§29-2628, See footnote 7.
29-2623 (1956).
NEv. REV. STATS. §§213.150, See footnote 7.
213.110(1) (1960).
Omo REv. CODE ANN. §2965. 21
(1963 Supp.).
S.C. CODE §§55-614, 55-616 See footnote 7.
(1963 Supp.).
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-62-38
(1953).




WIS. STATS. ANN. §57.06(3) See footnote 7.
(1963 Supp.).
Wyo. STATS. §7-326 (1957). See footnote 7.
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Statutes
ALA. CODE tit. 42, §24 (1958)
COLO. REv. STATS. ANN. §39-
16-9 (1953).
CoNN. GEN. STATS. ANN. §54
114 (1960).
ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 38, §117
(eff. Jan. 1, 1964).
IND. STATS. ANN. §9-2211
(1956).
Charter & Public Local Laws
of Baltimore City §279
(Flack 1947).
ME. REv. STATS. ch. 27-A,
§8 (1963 Supp.).
N.Y. CODE CRILL Pnoc. §935
(1958).
N.D. CENT. CODE §§12-53-11
12-53-15 (1963 Supp.).
Oiro REv. CODE ANN. §§295
08, 2951.09 (1958).
S.C. CoDE §§55-595, 55-596
(1962).
TEXAS CODE Cam.. PRoc. art
781d, §8 (1962 Supp.).
Statutes
18 U.S.C. §4207 (1951).
ALASKA STATS. §33.15.220
(1962).
Am. REV. STATS. ANN. §31-
417 (1956).
HAwi REv. LAWS §83-65
(1961 Supp.).



























WASH. REv. CODE §9.95.220
(1961).
WXs. STATS. ANN. §§57.03,
57.04(2) (1957).
Wyo. STATS. §7-321 (1959).
PAROLE
IV







The revocation of probation in Maryland is primarily
handled on a local level. Only Baltimore is listed here,
although hearings are generally required in other




Hearing "without unreasonable delay" and under rules
adopted by board.
No hearing required, however, when parole violation
charged is conviction of a new crime while out on
parole.
Hearing is held under rules and regulations adopted by
board.
Included within this category are statutes which revoking authority to "inquire into" the charges. Such
provide that the alleged violator shall have "An op- provisions are more prevalent in the parole revocation
portunity to appear" before or "an opportunity to be feld.

















KAN. GEN. STATS. §62-2250 Hearing is held under rules and regulations adopted by
(1961). board.
Ky. REV. STATS. ANN. §§39.
330(1)(e), 439.430(1), 439.
440 (1963).
LA. REV. STATS. §15:574.9 Hearing shall be held "at the request of the parolee."
(1963 Supp.).
ME. REV. STATS. ch. 27-A, §15
(1963 Supp.).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §115
(1957).
MISS. CODE ANN. §4004-13
(1956).
Mo. ANN. STATS. §549.265 Hearing is held under rules and regulations adopted by
(1963 Supp.). board.
N.H. REV. STATS. ANN. §607:
46 (1955).
PA. STATS. ANN. tit. 61, §331. Hearing only required for "technical" violations. No
21a(b) (1963 Supp.). hearing necessary when violation charged is con-
viction of a new crime while out on parole.
TExAs CODE CRim. PROC. art. Hearing is held under rules and regulations adopted by
781d, §22 (1962 Supp.). board.













IDAHO CODE §20-222 (1947).
KAN. GEN. STATS. §62-2244
(1961).
LA. REV. STATS. §15: 534(c)
(1963 Supp.).
MONT. REV. CODE §94-9831
(1963 Supp.).
N.H. REV. STATS. ANN. §504:4
(1955).
N.J. STATS. ANN. §2A:168-4
(1953).
ORE. REV. STATS. §137.550(2)
(1961).
VT. STATs. ANN. tit. 28, §1015
(1958).
W. VA. Code §6291(17) (1961).
PAROLE
Comments
PROBATION AND PAROLE REVOCATION HEARINGS
VI
STATUTES WHICH EXPRESSLY GUARANTEE OR DISPENSE WITH'
0 
CERTAIN TRADITIONAL


















FLA. STATS. ANN. §948.06 Probationer entitled to counsel and to be "fully heard."
(1944). Probationer advised of charges and allowed, in effect,
to plead to them, after which probation may be
revoked (if charge admitted) or charge may be dis-
missed or probationer may be held for a hearing.
GA. CODE ANN. §27-2713 Probationer entitled to counsel and to be "fully heard."
(1963 Supp.).
HAwAII REV. LAWS §258-56 Probationer is to "appear ... and show cause" why
(1955). probation should not be revoked, implying, at least,
a right to produce evidence.
MICiL STATS. ANN. §28.1134 "Summary and informal" hearing, with "a written copy
(1954). of the charges" given to the probationer prior to the
hearing.
MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.14 "Summary hearing" at which probationer "entitled to
(1963 Supp.). be heard and to be represented by counsel."
N.M. STATS. AnN. §40A-29-20 Alleged violation read to probationer who may admit or
(1963 Supp.). deny charges; if he denies them, he is to be "furnished
a copy of the petition" to revoke and a hearing is set
down no sooner than 5 days or more than 10 days
later.
N.C. GEN. STATS. §§15-200, Probationer to be informed of the grounds of the in-
15-200.1 (1963 Supp.). tended revocation and, at his request, the court
"shall grant a reasonable time for the defendant to
prepare his defense."




ALA. CODE tit. 42, §12 (1958). Parolee entitled to counsel and may "produce witnesses
and explain charges made against him."
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §7714 No specific elements guaranteed but extent of hearing
(1953). indicated by unique provision "in case the Board
finds there is reasonable boubt of a violation of
parole, ... the prisoner shall be continued on
parole.../'
D.C. CODE §24-206 (1961). Parolee entitled to counsel.
FLA. STATS. ANN. §947.23(1) Parolee entitled to counsel "and a hearing shall be had
(1963 Supp.). at which the state and the parolee may introduce such
evidence as they may deem necessary and pertinent
to the charge of parole violation."
GA. CODE ANN. §77-519 (1963 Parolee entitled to introduce evidence; parole "may be
Supp.). revoked without a hearing" if parolee has been con-
victed of "any crime" while on parole.











MICE. STATS. ANN. §28.2310
(1954).
MONT. REv. CODE §§94-9838,
94-9835 (1963 Supp.).
N.M. STATS. ANN. §41-17-28
(1963 Supp.).
N.Y. CoRREcTION LAW §218
(1963 Supp.).
TENN. CODE §40-3619 (1955).
WASH. REV. CODE §9.95.120
(1961).
W. VA. CODE §6291(26)
(1961).
CASES DECIDED UNDER STATUTES WHICH Do NOT
REQUIRE A HEARING (CATEGORIES I AND
II OF CHARTS)
No Right to Hearing: Probation
The approach utilized by the courts of juris-
dictions in which statutes, expressly or by silence,
do not require hearings to be held before probation
is revoked is typified by the 1942 Oklahoma case
of Ex Parte Boyd."
Although it was at one time a matter of dispute
whether courts possessed the inherent power to
suspend the imposition or execution of sentence
for a definite period and place the defendant on
probation "upon considerations extraneous to the
legality of the conviction,' 2 the matter of proba-
tion is now completely regulated by statutes.
Accordingly, in the Boyd case, emphasis was first
placed on the Oklahoma statute and the control-
ling role it plays "in determining the procedure to
be followed" in revoking probation. 3 It necessarily
followed from this emphasis that cases interpret-
ing statutes containing language different from
that of the forum had to be set to one side.14 The
n 73 Okla. Crim. 441, 122 P.2d 162 (1942).
12 See Es parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916).




Very detailed provision: parolee entitled to counsel "of
his own choice"; "may defend himself, and he shall
have the right to produce witnesses and proofs in his
favor and to meet the witnesses who are produced
against him"; board may subpoena witness for parolee
"without whose testimony he cannot safely proceed
to hearing." Statute not applicable where parolee has
been convicted of a new crime while on parole.
Parolee entitled to counsel.
Parolee not entitled to counsel.
Parolee may "appear personally, but not through coun-
sel or others,... and explain the charges made
against him."
Parolee may "appear personally, but not through coun-
sel or others,... and explain the charges made against
him."
Parolee entitled to counsel and may present evidence
and Witnesses in his own behalf; hearing to be "fair
and impartial." No hearing required if parolee con-
victed of new crime while on parole.
Parolee entitled to counsel at a "prompt summary
hearing."
next step, naturally, was to examine the Oklahoma
statute to determine just what powers it conferred
upon the revoking court. The court, in deciding
that a hearing was not required by the statute,
noted the absence of any express provision in the
statute for notice or a hearing and the presence of
a provision authorizing imprisonment "forthwith"
upon a finding of probation violation.'- Having
construed the statute to authorize revocation
without a hearing, the court was then compelled
to grapple with the due process question, that is,
whether the revocation of probation without a
hearing is consonant with procedural fairness.
As might be expected, the courts throughout the
country divide on this question. The Boyd court
held that revocation of probation without a hear-
ing accords with due process, reasoning:
" 'While under a suspended sentence, a duly
convicted person is not freed from the legal
consequences of his guilt. He is merely enjoying
a conditional favor, postponing his punishment,
which may be withdrawn. When the suspension
is revoked the convict is punished for the crime
of which he was convicted, and not for violating
the terms of his [probation]. The suspension of
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sentence can never be demanded as a matter of
legal right. It is granted at the mere will of the
court. When granted, it is not held as a vested
right, but as a matter of favor or grace.... In
exercising [their revocation powers] ... courts
must necessarily have a large discretion....
They are not dealing with specific legal rights
and are not bound by the standards of legal pro-
cedure which usually control judicial proceed-
ings. [Therefore], an order suspending sentence
may be revoked without granting the defendant
a trial upon the facts.' ",16
This line of reasoning supporting the revocation
of probation without a hearing-that probation
is a matter of grace conferring only a privilege
upon the probationer and not a legal right-is
commonly referred to as the "act of grace" or
"privilege" theory.
A caveat is often attached to the decisions ap-
proving revocation without a hearing, namely
that an order revoking probation will be set aside
"if it can be shown that the court's action was arbi-
trary or governed solely by whim or caprice of the
judge, without a legal foundation."'
The case law in Arizona,' California, i9 District
of Columbia,20 Iowa,"2 Missouri,.
2 North Dakota, 3
'6 Id. at 452-53, 454, 122 P.2d at 168, quoting from
the dissenting opinion in State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah
296, 259 Pac. 1044 (1927).
17 73 Okla. Crim. at 462-63, 122 P.2d at 172. The
Boyd decision has been consistently followed in Okla-
homa. See Valentine v. State, 365 P.2d 166 (Okla.
Crim. 1961); In re Luckens, 372 P.2d 635 (Okla. Crim.
1962) ("better practice" is that application by authori-
ties to revoke probation "apprise the accused of the
specific grounds" of the violation charged, but failure
so to do is not violative of due process; only question
for review is whether revocation was "arbitrary and
capricious").
18 Varela v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569 (1937);
Ex parle Johnson, 53 Ariz. 161, 87 P.2d 107 (1939).
Compare McGee v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Pa-
roles, 92 Ariz. 317, 376 P.2d 779 (1962) (due process
requires notice to the prisoner and an opportunity to
be heard on application for commutation of a death
sentence).
19 In re Davis, 37 Cal. 2d 872, 236 P.2d 579 (1951);
In re Levi, 39 Cal. 2d 41, 244 P.2d 403 (1952); In re
Dearo, 96 Cal. App. 2d 141, 214 P.2d 585 (1950).
10 Stevens v. District of Columbia, 127 A.2d 147
(D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1956) (dictum). Cases indicate,
however, that the practice in the District of Columbia
is to hold a hearing at which counsel is present and
evidence is taken. Cooper v. United States, 48 A.2d
771 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1946); Stevens v. District
of Columbia, supra; United States v. Freeman, 160 F.
Supp. 532 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 352 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
21Pagano v. Bechley, 211 Iowa 1294, 232 N.W.
798 (1930); Lint v. Bennett, 251 Iowa 1193, 104
N.W.2d 564 (1960).
and South Dakota 4 is basically in accordance with
the view taken in Boyd.
25
The cases in California and Iowa not only permit
revocation without a hearing, but condone ex
parte revocation-revocation ordered in the ab-
sence of the probationer. At least two of the other
jurisdictions listed, Oklahoma and South Dakota,
will permit ex parte revocation only if the ex parte
demonstration to the trial court clearly estab-
lishes a breach of one or more conditions of
release.26 South Dakota goes further, in fact, and
requires a "hearing" if the ex parte demonstration
is not "sufficient to justify the exercise of the
court's discretion."
The Arizona courts will not review the record on
appeal to determine whether there has been an
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge.
This, as noted, is contrary to the ordinary prac-
tice.2 8 If it appears that the probationer in Arizona
was allowed an opportunity to make some kind of
statement to the court prior to the order revoking
probation, which statement was not sufficient to
convince the trial court that he had lived up to the
conditions of his probation, then it will be "con-
clusively presumed" that the trial court had suffi-
cient cause to revoke.
29
The case law in California is worth further
attention. As already observed, California permits
ex parte revocation. The case establishing this
rule, In Re Dais,n advanced the "act of grace"
22 State v. Brantley, 353 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. 1962), de-
cided under former statute which provided for an "in-
formal" hearing. Court, in dicta, but after careful
consideration, adopted the view that notice or a hear-
ing is not required by the constitution.
23 State v. Uttke, 60 N.D. 377, 234 N.W. 79 (1931);
State v. Cowdrey, 73 N.D. 630, 17 N.W.2d 900 (1945)
(by implication in both cases; hearings in fact held).
24 Application of Jerrel, 77 S.D. 487, 93 N.W.2d
614 (1958); State v. Elder, 77 S.D. 540, 95 N.W.2d
592 (1959).
2" Note that, prior to the enactment of its present
hearing statute in 1963, the law in Minnesota was also
in line with the Boyd case. State v. Chandler, 158
Minn. 447, 197 N.W. 847 (1924); State ex rd. Jenks v.
Municipal Court, 197 Minn. 141, 266 N.W. 433 (1936);
Breeding v. Swenson, 240 Minn. 93, 60 N.W.2d 4
(1953). The same was true in Kansas and Michigan
under their earlier statutes. In re Patterson, 94 Kan.
439, 146 Pac. 1009 (1915); People v. Dudley, 173
Mich. 389, 138 N.W. 1044 (1912).
261Ex parle Boyd, 73 Okla. Crim. at 459, 122 P.2d
at 170-71; Application of Jerrel, 77 S.D. at 492-93,
93 N.W.2d at 617.
2Application of Jerrel, supra note 26.
23 Supra note 17, and accompanying text.
2  Varela v. Merrill and Ex parle Johnson, supra
note 18.
'0 Supra note 19.
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or "privilege" theory to support its position. A
later case, In re Levi,31 added as a ground for
denying a hearing that a proceeding to revoke
probation is not a criminal prosecution.
Nevertheless, the practice in California, as indi-
cated by the case law, is to hold hearings before
probation is revoked. The imprint of Davis and
Levi is seen, however, in the nature of the hearing
granted. The "informality" of the proceedings is
continually stressed in the cases.Y The court may
revoke probation solely on the basis of the proba-
tion officer's report.n There is no right to present
witnesses,4 even those who are present in the
courtroom during the hearing.35 The probationer
may even be denied the right to testify.36 There is
no right to counsel,' although the defendant may
sometimes be represented by counsel. 38
There is one curious twist to California law.
In re Davis and the other cases noted involved
instances where sentence was imposed and execu-
tion thereof suspended-the ordinary case in Cali-
fornia. Where, however, the imposition of sentence
is suspended, a hearing must be held before proba-
tion may be revoked,3' at which the probationer is
entitled to counsel. 4' These rules apply because
when judgment is not pronounced and further
proceedings are suspended, no judgment is out-
standing against the probationer. Upon revocation,
the probationer is entitled to a hearing at which
judgment is pronounced. This situation is, accord-
ing to the California courts, unlike the case where
sentence is imposed and its execution suspended,
since in the latter case revocation simply brings
the sentence which was already imposed into
effect.
4'
31 Supra note 19.
32 In re Levi, supra note 19; In re Young, 121 Cal.
App. 711, 10 P.2d 154 (1932); In re Cook, 67 Cal.
App. 2d 20, 153 P.2d 578 (1944); People v. Johns, 173
Cal. App. 2d 38, 343 P.2d 92 (1959); People v. Wim-
berly, 30 Cal. Rptr. 421 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
n People v. Root, 192 Cal. App. 2d 158, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 209 (1961); People v. Walker, 30 Cal. Rptr. 440
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
34 People v. Hayden, 99 Cal. App. 2d 141, 221 P.2d
221 (1950).
35 People v. Slater, 152 Cal. App. 2d 814, 313 P.2d
111 (1957).
3 People v. Natividad, 29 Cal. Rptr. 468 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963).
37 In re Levi, supra note 19; People v. Wimberly,
sepra note 32.
-' People v. Walker, supra note 33.
39 Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 338 P.2d
182 (1959); In re Klein, 197 Cal. App. 2d 58, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 71 (1962).
40 In re Levi, supra note 19.
41 Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d at 874, 338 P.2d
at 187.
Note, however, that the hearing required in
California where the imposition of sentence has
been suspended is not the hearing ordinarily con-
templated in a probation revocation case. That is,
the fact of a violation of probation is not before
the court. The probationer is in the same position
as he would be if probation had not been granted
and he were to be sentenced immediately following
conviction. He may show that there is legal cause
why judgment shall not be pronounced against
him or that he is now insane, or he may show good
cause to order a new trial or to grant a motion in
arrest of judgment." None of these arguments in-
volves the question whether he violated the terms
and conditions of his probation, although, of
course, the sentencing court would have discretion
to hear and consider argument on this question.
No Right to Hearing: Parole
Parole, it should be noted at the outset, is not
the sole form of conditional release from imprison-
ment. The governor may grant what is called a
"conditional pardon." Conditional pardons were
more prevalent around the turn of the twentieth
century than they are now for the simple reason
that parole, as a method of conditional release,
was then only in the formative stages.0 The "con-
ditional pardon" was the only means by which a
prisoner could be released subject to a threat of
reimprisonment if he failed to conform his conduct
to the requirements of society. Full pardon was
inapposite. It operated as a remission of guilt,
completely freeing the offender from the control of
the state.4 It was an act of mercy,41 whereas a
conditional pardon is rehabilatory in nature,4"
similar in that respect to present-day parole sys-
tems. While the conditional pardon is slowly
becoming extinct, early cases dealing with its
revocation, because of its similarity in purpose to
parole, form the basis in many jurisdictions for
modern parole revocation decisions and are in-
cluded in the discussion to follow.
A leading decision in the parole revocation field
is the Oregon case of lit re Anderson.' The revoca-
4In re Levi, supra note 19, at 46, 244 P.2d at 405.
41 See generally 4 ATTORNEY GENERAL's SURVEY or
RELEASE PROCEDURES 2-27 (1939).
41 Id. at 2.
45 See, e.g., Ex parle Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21
(1925); Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
46 See, e.g., Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 37, 26 So.
146, 147 (1899); In re Patterson, 94 Kan. 439, 442,
146 Pac. 1009, 1011 (1915); 4 ATr~oREY GENERAL'S
SURVEY or RELEASE PROCEDURES 2 (1939).
4 191 Ore. 409, 229 P.2d 633 (1951).
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ton there was ex parte. After construing its
statutes "in their context" and deciding that the
board was empowered to revoke the prisoner's
parole without notice or hearing, the court turned
to the constitutional issue. Its decision thereon
followed upon a particularly exhaustive analysis
of the relevant case law. The court held the ex
parte procedure constitutional, relying primarily,
through quotations from other cases, on the "act
of grace" theory. A special concurring opinion
rested squarely on this theory.
4
The opinion of the court alludes to the familiar
doctrine that the parolee, while not entitled to a
hearing in the first instance, may challenge the
revocation on habeas corpus and is entitled to his
release if he can establish that the board acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, or in abuse of its statu-
tory powers.49
The Ohio case of it re Varner," reaching the
same conclusion as the Anderson case, observed,
first, that a legislative intent to grant a hearing
should not be recognized "unless it is clearly ex-
pressed" in the statutes and not left to conjec-
ture; 5 it then proposed certain "policy reasons"
for upholding revocation without notice or hearing.
The policy reasons advanced were (1) "potential
witnesses justifiably are fearful of testifying pub-
licly against a paroled convict" and, therefore, in
order to determine whether the parolee should be
returned to prison as a violator "it may be neces-
sary for the commission to rely upon secret in-
vestigations"; 52 and (2) if parole could not be
revoked except after a hearing, "the resulting
burdens of administration of the commission and
its desire to protect the public would undoubtedly
discourage the commission from granting many
paroles that it otherwise would grant," thus de-
feating the purpose of parole." The court con-
cluded on the more familiar note that the parolee
had no right to a parole, so "it would seem that he
should have no right to contest what may be in
substance a revocation of his parole."64
In Oklahoma" and Minnesota, 6 also, the re-
43 Id. at 451-52, 229 P.2d at 651.
49 Id. at 430-31, 447, 229 P.2d at 642, 649.
0 166 Ohio St. 340, 142 N.E.2d 846 (1957).
" Id. at 345, 142 N.E.2d at 849.
" Ibid. Accord, State ex rd. McQueen v. Horton, 31
Ala. App. 71, 76, 14 So. 2d 557, 560, aff'd, 244 Ala.
594, 14 So. 2d 561 
(1943).
5 166 Ohio St. at 345, 142 N.E.2d at 849.
"Id. at 347, 142 N.E.2d at 851. The order revoking
parole, it seems, is non-reviewable in Ohio. Ibid; Bus-
sey v. Sacks, 172 Ohio St. 392, 176 N.E.2d 220 (1961).
5 Ex parte Ridley, 3 Okla. Crim. 350, 106 Pac. 549
vocation of parole without a hearing is supported
by the "act of grace" theory. ,
Revocation of conditional pardon without a
hearing has been held permissible on the ground
that the pardon was accepted subject to the condi-
tion that it might be summarily revoked without
notice or hearing, and that, therefore, the parolee
is bound by this condition-denominated the
"contract" theory- s in Iowa,"9 Minnesota,60
Massachusetts, 6 Nebraska, 62 Oklahoma,63 and
Vermont."
In Utah, the Supreme Court approved revoca-
tion of the prisoner's parole without a hearing on
the principal ground that the parolee "is legally
in custody the same as the prisoner allowed the
liberty of the prison yard, or of working on the
prison farm. The realm in which he serves has
been extended."65
There is dicta in four California cases that
(1910); Application of Cooley, 295 P.2d 816 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1956).
51, State x rd. Jaffa v. Crepeau, 150 Minn. 80, 184
N.W. 567 (1921); State ex rd. Bush v. Whittier, 226
Minn. 356, 32 N.W.2d 856 (1948).
57 In Rhode Island, the statute expressly authorizes
revocation of parole "with or without a hearing."
While no case has dealt with the hearing question, a
recent case, considering another phase of the parole
process, has emphasized its privilege aspects and the
power of the legislature "to attach conditions to the
grant of parole and to provide for the administration
thereof," an indication that when the hearing question
is raised the statute will be upheld. State v. Fazzano,
194 A.2d 680, 684 (R.I. 1963).
Is See Weihofen, Revoking Probation, Parole or Par-
don Without a Hearing, 32 J. Cam. L. & C. 531 (1942).
59Arthur v. Craig, 48 Iowa 264 (1878); State ex
rel. Davis v. Hunter, 124 Iowa 569, 100 N.W. 510
(1904).
10 Guy v. Utecht, 216 Minn. 255, 12 N.W.2d 753
(1943); Washburn v. Utecht, 236 Minn. 31, 51 N.W.2d
657 (1952). The court in Guy v. Utecht was careful
to point out, however, that revocation without a hear-
ing is permissible only where the conditional pardon
contains a reservation that it may be revoked sum-
marily without a hearing or, as is the case with parole
(see note 56 supra), where statutes authorize revocation
without a hearing. Othenvise, the prisoner is entitled
to a "judicial inquiry into the alleged breach" of the
terms of his conditional pardon. 216 Minn. at 267, 12
N.W.2d at 759, approving the early case of State ex
rel. O'Conner v. Wolfer, 53 Minn. 135, 54 N.W. 1065
(1893).
1 Kennedy's Case, 135 Mass. 48 (1883).
62 Owen v. Smith, 89 Neb. 596, 131 N.W. 914 (1911).
13 Ex parte Rigley, supra note 55 (called a "parole"
but granted by the Governor).
14 In re Sauder, 122 Vt. 168, 167 A.2d 368 (1961).
6-1McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 410, 160 P.2d
721, 722 (1945). The authority of this case was seri-
ously weakened by dicta in Baine v. Beckstead, 10
Utah 2d 4, 347 P.2d 554 (1959), a probation revoca-
tion case considered infra notes 69 to 72.
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"parole may be validly revoked without notice or
hearing."
66
Right to Hearing: Probation
Of those jurisdictions where the statutes pres-
ently do not require that a hearing be held before
probation is revoked, the courts of three states
have decided that a hearing is mandatory.
In Utah, the requirement of a hearing is postu-
lated on both constitutional and policy grounds.
The conditional liberty of probation, rather than a
matter of grace, is viewed in the leading case of
State v. Zolantakis0' as a "valuable right" not to
be "regarded lightly" and not to be taken from
the probationer except after a hearing "according
to some well recognized and established rules of
judicial procedure." From a policy viewpoint, the
court added that reformation-the sole purpose of
probation-"can best be accomplished by fair,
consistent and straightforward treatment of the
person sought to be reformed."60 At the hearing,
the court instructed, the defendant should have
the opportunity to plead to or answer "a written
pleading setting forth the facts relied upon for
... revocation", and he should be given the right
6In re McLain, 55 Cal. 2d 78, 85, 357 P.2d 1080,
1084-85 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 10 (1961) (term
of imprisonment increased and parole, which was to go
into effect at a future date, revoked, without affording
prisoner a hearing); In re Dearo, 96 Cal. App. 2d 141,
144, 214 P.2d 585, 587 (1950) (probation revocation
case); In re Etie, 27 Cal. 2d 753, 758, 167 P.2d 203,
206 (1946); In re Tobin, 130 Cal. App. 371, 375, 20
P.2d 91, 92 (1933). In the last two cases hearings were
in fact held to determine whether "good-behavior"
credits, which were earned prior to the alleged parole
violation, were to be forfeited. This question turned
on whether or not parole had been violated. Hearings
are customarily held in California when parole is re-
voked since the forfeiture of "good-behavior" credits
is a normal consequence of violating parole and, by
statute (CAL. PENAL CODE §2924 (1963 Supp.)), a
hearing, at which the prisoner "shall be present and
entitled to be heard and may present evidence and
witnesses in his behalf'" must be held before "good-
behavior" credits may be forfeited. See In re Etie and
In re Tobin, supra; In re Taylor, 216 Cal. 113, 13 P.2d
906 (1932); In re Payton, 28 Cal. 2d 194, 169 P.2d 361
(1946); In re Borgfeldt, 75 Cal. App. 2d 83, 170 P.2d
94 (1946). Further complicating California law is the
decision that the parole authority may redetermine
and increase the sentence of a person out on parole
from eight to ten years without affording him notice
or a hearing. In re Smith, 33 Cal. 2d 797, 205 P.2d 662
(1949). Although such action does not result in reim-
prisonment and is clearly distinguishable from parole
revocation for that reason, the Smith case has been
cited in California as authority for revoking parole
without a hearing. In re McLain, supra; In re Dearo,
supra.
67 70 Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044 (1927).
6s Id. at 303, 259 Pac. at 1046, 1047.
to be heard and to cross-examine witnesses who
testify against him.
The later Utah case of Baine v. Beckstead
69 re-
affirmed the Zolantakis case, but pointed out that
the hearing procedures outlined in Zolantakis
should be limited to cases where a factual dispute
exists, where "the circumstances in fairness and
justice warrant the granting of a hearing to the
defendant."" ° In dicta, the court said that there
should be no difference between probation and
parole, since both have as their purpose reforma-
tion of the individual. Both probationer and
parolee "should be able to rely upon the representa-
tion that if he measures up to his responsibilities,
he will not have his liberty taken from him capri-
ciously nor arbitrarily."' The parole revocation
case of McCoy v. Harris," which sanctioned revo-
cation of parole without a hearing, was distin-
guished on the ground that no factual dispute
existed which required resolution at a hearing.
Revocation of probation without "notice and an
opportunity to be heard" was held violative of due
process of law by the New Mexico Supreme Court
in Ex parte Lucero,"" the court stressing that sus-
pension of sentence "gives to the defendant a valu-
able right," that of "personal liberty," and by the
Washington Supreme Court in State v. O'Neal.
4
the court quoting extensively from the Lucero
case. Both cases were decided under statutes
which did not require a hearing. The Washington
statute presently requires that the probationer be
"brought before the court." A 1963 amendment
to the New Mexico statute requires that a hearing
be held.
In Arkansas, without reliance upon the consti-
tution, it has been held error to deny the proba-
tioner the right to testify and call witnesses at the
hearing to revoke his probation.
5 Similarly, in
Nebraska, without resort to the constitution, the
69 10 Utah 2d 4, 347 P.2d 554 (1959).
70 Id. at 8, 10-11, 347 P.2d at 557, 559. And see
McPhie v. Turner, 10 Utah 2d 237, 351 P.2d 91 (1960),
holding that revocation of probation without a hear-
ing on the facts there presented "was a denial of due
process of law."
7110 Utah 2d at 9, 347 P.2d at 558.
7"Supra note 65.
7-123 N.M. 433, 168 Pac. 713 (1917), followed in
State v. Peoples, 69 N.M. 106, 364 P.2d 359 (1961).
Both cases apply the universal rule that a defendant
is not entitled to a jury trial on the question of revoca-
tion, unless he pleads "want of identity of himself
and the person originally sentenced."
74 147 Wash. 169, 265 Pac. 175 (1928), approved in
State v. Shannon, 60 Wash. 2d 883, 376 P.2d 646
(1962).
71 Gerard v. State 363 S.W.2d 916 (Ark. 1963).
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courts have consistently held that the revocation
process be instituted either by a "verified informa-
tion stating specifically the conduct constituting
a violation of probationary conditions" or by a
motion to revoke probation and order to show
cause. The information, however, need not be as
precise as is necessary when instituting a formal
criminal proceeding. 6 If the probationer pleads
not guilty to the information or motion to revoke
probation, a hearing is held
Right to Hearing: Parole
A case of importance is Fleenor v. Hainmond.
decided by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit. A conditional pardon granted
by the governor of Kentucky was revoked in that
case without notice or hearing on the ground that
a power to revoke in such a manner had been
reserved by the governor in the pardon.Y The
federal court, bound by the construction placed on
the pardon by the state court, framed the ques-
tion for decision as whether summary revocation
of a pardon, without a hearing, impaired peti-
tioner's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court held that it did, and, in a significant
passage, took direct issue with the "act of grace"
theory:
"'We may grant at once that the giving of a
pardon is an act of grace; that to it the Governor
may attach conditions; that if any condition is
broken the Governor may revoke and that his
judgment as to the breach is final and conclu-
sive upon the courts. It does not follow, how-
ever, from the reservation of a right to revoke,
that it may be exercised arbitrarily or upon
whim, caprice, or rumor.... It is our conclusion
that the petitioner's right to his freedom under
the terms of the pardon could not be revoked
without such hearing as is the generally ac-
cepted prerequisite of due process .... 8o
76 See Sellers v. State, 105 Neb. 748, 750, 181 N.W.
862, 863 (1921); Moore v. State, 125 Neb. 565, 251
N.W. 117 (1933); Carr v. State, 152 Neb. 248, 40
N.W.2d 677 (1950); Young v. State, 155 Neb. 261,
51 N.W.2d 326 (1952); Phoenix v. State, 162 Neb.
669, 77 N.W.2d 237 (1956).
7 Moyer v. State, 144 Neb. 673, 14 N.W.2d 220
(1944); Reinmuth v. State, 163 Neb. 724, 80 N.W.2d
874 (1957); Carr v. State, Young v. State, Phoenix v.
State, supra note 76.
78 116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1941).
79 Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith v. Hall, 277 Ky.
612, 126 S.W.2d 1056 (1939).
so 116 F.2d at 986. (Emphasis added.) Accord, State
ex rel. Murray v. Swenson, 196 Md. 222, 76 A.2d 150
(1950), holding that revocation of a conditional pardon
In three states having statutes that do not re-
quire a hearing, it can fairly be said that case law
exacts a hearing before parole can be revoked. In
one of these states, Utah, the requirement of a
hearing is to be found in a dictum in Baine v.
Beckstead, considered in the preceding section.
The Illinois Supreme Court, viewing the due
process clause as applicable to every proceeding
which may deprive a person of his liberty, "whether
the process be judicial or administrative or execu-
tive in its nature," refused to regard parole as "a
mere act of grace and favor by the board of par-
dons or the warden." Construing the statute then
on the books to require that a hearing be held, the
court wrote: "As we hold that the relator is en-
titled to a hearing..., the act does not deprive
him of his liberty without due process of law .... ,,8,
The present Illinois statute does not contain the
clause relied on by the court for its construction of
the earlier statute. It would have to follow, how-
ever, under the authority of this case, that revoca-
tion of parole without a hearing would be declared
unconstitutional in Illinois.
The Virginia court in Hudson v. Youell 8" observ-
ing that its statute failed to specify the procedure
for revoking a conditional pardon, decided that a
hearing should be held because it was "the estab-
lished practice at common law and in the American
States" to hold such hearings, at least in the
absence of any statute or reservation in the pardon
authorizing revocation without a hearing.
CASES DECIDED UNDER STATUTES VHIC
EXPRESSLY OR ILmEDLY REQUIRE A HEARING
(CATEGORIES III TO VI OF CHARTS)
Probation
It would be expected that decisions in jurisdic-
tions where hearings are expressly or impliedly
required by statute would recognize the right of a
probationer to a hearing on the revocation of
probation. Such is indeed the case; however, the
nature and type of hearing required vary with the
jurisdiction and, to some extent, the language of
the statute.
Two influential decisions are out of the United
States Supreme Court, construing the federal
statute which requires that the probationer be
without a hearing amounts to deprivation of a valuable
right through "arbitrary action."
81 People ex rel. Joyce v. Strassheim, 242 Ill. 359,
366, 367:-68, 90 N.E. 118, 120, 121 (1909).
178 Va. 525, 17 S.E.2d 403 (1941), modified on
other grounds, 179 Va. 442, 19 S.E.2d 705 (1942).
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"taken before the court." In Burns v. United
States,3 a unanimous Court, noting that probation
is a "privilege and cannot be demanded as a right,"
formulated certain "principles":
"The question,... in the case of the revoca-
tion of probation, is not one of formal procedure
either with respect to notice or specification of
charges or a trial upon charges. The question is
simply whether there has been an abuse of dis-
cretion and is to be determined in accordance
with familiar principles governing the exercise
of judicial discretion. That exercise implies
conscientious judgment, not arbitrary action.
... While probation is a matter of grace, the
probationer is entitled to fair treatment, and is
not to be made the victim of whim and
caprice."
In Escoe v. Zerbstu the Court expanded on
what it said in Burns, explaining that the hearing,
while it need not be formal in nature, must be "so
fitted in its range to the needs of the occasion as
to justify the conclusion that discretion has not
been abused by the failure of the inquisitor to
carry the probe deeper." The probationer must be
given the opportunity "to explain away" charges
which "may have been inspired by rumor or mis-
take or downright malice. He shall have a chance
to say his say before the word of his pursuers is
received to his undoing.
' 86
Then, in a celebrated dictum, the Escoe Court
rejected the probationer's contention that a hear-
ing is mandated by the federal Constitution. The
lawmakers, the Court observed, could, if they
wished, "dispense with notice or a hearing."
"Probation or suspension of sentence comes as an
act of grace to one convicted of a crime," the
Court wrote tersely, "and may be coupled with
such conditions in respect of its duration as
Congress may impose. '
Following the lead thus set by the Supreme
Court, state and lower federal court decisions are
legion which stress the informality of the hearing
287 U.S. 216 (1932).
9 Id. at 222-23.
88 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
8 8Id. at 493.
SId. at 492-93. State and lower federal courts
tend to give this dictum the weight of a holding. See,
e.g., Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 238 (D.C. Cir.
1963); United States v. Freeman, 160 F. Supp. 532
(D.D.C. 1957), af'd, 254 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
In re Davis, 37 Cal. 2d 872, 236 P.2d 579 (1951), dis-
cussed supra notes 19, 30; In re Anderson, 191 Ore.
409, 434, 438, 447, 229 P.2d 633, 644, 646, 649 (1951),
discussed supra notes 47-49.
granted by their statutes, occasionally adding that
the test is one of the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, whether the probationer was accorded
"fair treatment." 8
The courts do not agree, however, as to just
how "informal" the hearing is to be. Certain tradi-
tional elements of a fair bearing are accorded the
probationer by the courts of some jurisdictions,8
and denied to him by others. A close majority of
the cases require that the probationer receive
notice prior to the hearing of the particular grounds
upon which revocation is sought;0 it is sufficient,
according to other cases, if the notice informs the
probationer that he is charged with a violation of
his probation, as by an order to show cause-that
is, if it simply brings him before the court.91 A clear
majority of the cases hold that the probationer is
entitled to introduce evidence and produce wit-
nesses on his own behalf;92 some few deny him that
11 See, e.g., Bennett v. United States, 158 F.2d 412
(8th Cir. 1946); Brown v. United States, 236 F.2d 253
(9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Feller, 17 Alaska 417,
156 F. Supp. 107 (1957); Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682,
32 So. 2d 607 (1947); Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474,
253 P.2d 794 (1953); Ridley v. Commonwealth, 287
S.W.2d 156 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956); Edwardsen v. State,
220 Md. 82, 151 A.2d 132 (1959); Murphy v. Lawhon,
213 Miss. 513, 57 So. 2d 154 (1952); State v. Zachow-
ski, 53 N.J. Super. 431, 147 A.2d 584 (1959); People
v. Oskroba, 305 N.Y. 113, 111 N.E.2d 235 (1953);
State v. Theisen, 167 Ohio St. 119, 146 N.E.2d 865
(1957); Amey v. State, 195 Tenn. 57, 256 S.W.2d
706 (1953); Stratmon v. State, 333 S.W.2d 135 (Tex.
Crim. 1960); Berry v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 495,
106 S.E.2d 590 (1959); State v. Shannon, 60 Wash.
2d 883, 376 P.2d 646 (1962).
80 Note that some statutes confer specific rights on
the probationer. See category VI of charts. Decisions
which merely echo such legislative fiat are not con-
sidered here.
90 Dingler v. State, 101 Ga. App. 312, 113 S.E.2d
496 (1960); People v. Price, 24 Ill. App. 2d 364, 376-
77, 164 N.E.2d 528, 533 (1960); Crenshaw v. State,
222 Md. 533, 161 A.2d 669 (1960); State v. Zachowski,
supra note 88, at 441, 147 A.2d at 590; People v.
Oskroba, supra note 88; State v. Gooding, 194 N.C.
271, 139 S.E. 436 (1927). See generally Note, 59 CoLum.
L. REv. 311, 326-28 (1959).
91 Manning v. United States, 161 F.2d 827 (5th
Cir. 1947); Ridley v. Commonwealth, supra note 88;
State v. Thiesen, supra note 88; State v. Maes, 127
S.C. 397, 120 S.E. 576 (1923); Berry v. Common-
wealth, supra note 88 (no advance notice given of any
kind). As to the federal rule, however, see Holtzoff,
Duties and Rights of Probationers, 21 Fed. Prob. 3, 8
(Dec. 1957).
"- Fiorella v. State, 40 Ala. App. 587, 590, 121 So.
2d 875, 878 (1960); Zerobnick v. City and County of
Denver, 139 Colo. 139, 337 P.2d 11 (1959) (must be
the "taking of evidence"); Moye v. Futch, 207 Ga.
52, 60 S.E.2d 137 (1950); People v. Enright, 332 Ill.
App. 655, 75 N.E.2d 777 (1947); In re Bobowski, 313
Mich. 521, 21 N.W.2d 838 (1946); Mason v. Cochran,
209 Miss. 163, 46 So. 2d 106 (1950); State v. Haber,
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right.9 The courts of Michigan require the authori-
ties to produce witnesses if the charges are de-
nied.14 Revocation based only on a probation
report has been reversed in Illinois." The courts in
three states explicitly recognize the probationer's
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.96
No court has expressly denied the probationer
the right to be represented at the hearing by
counsel of his own choosing.97 However, a split
exists on whether there is a right to have counsel
appointed by the court. The federal courts hold
that no such right exists.9 New York seems to
agree, 9  as does Washington."9 9 Illinois, on the
other hand, requires assignment of counsel for the
indigent probationer."' The Maryland Court of
Appeals has informed trial courts that they "may"
assign counsel to represent the probationer, 9 ' but
it does not appear that a "right" exists in that
jurisdiction to have counsel assigned, at least in
the absence of extraordinary circumstances.' 09
132 N.J.L. 507, 512, 41 A.2d 326, 329 (1945); People
v. Oskroba, supra note 88 ("opportunity to attack or
deny the charge").
9' Brozosky v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 222 N.W. 311
(1928); cf. Pritchett v. United States, 67 F.2d 244
(4th Cir. 1933) (whether to hear probationer's char-
acter witnesses is discretionary with court).
14 People v. Myers, 306 Mich. 100, 10 N.W.2d 323
(1943); In re Bobowski, supra note 92; People V. Rud-
nik, 333 Mich. 216, 52 N.W.2d 671 (1952).
91 People v. Warren, 314 Ill. App. 198, 40 N.E.2d
845 (1942); People v. Enright, supra note 92.
06 Robinson v. State, 62 Ga. App. 539, 8 S.E.2d
698 (1940); Moye v. Futch, supra note 92; People v.
Price, supra note 90, at 377-79, 164 N.E.2d at 534-35;
State v. Zachowski, supra note 88, at 441, 147 A.2d
at 590.
91 The federal courts permit representation by re-
tained counsel. See Holtzoff, supra note 91. In Mary-
land, however, the Court of Appeals has observed that
the revoking court "may, but is not obliged to, advise
the defendant of his right to obtain counsel ... .
Crenshaw v. State, 222 Md. 533, 535, 161 A.2d 669,
671 (1960).
98 Bennett v. United States, 158 F.2d 412 (8th Cir.
1946); Gillespie v. Hunter, 159 F.2d 410 (10th Cir.
1947); Kelley v. United States, 235 F.2d 44 (4th Cir.
1956); Cupp v. Byington, 179 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Ind.
1960). But see Mason v. United States, 303 F.2d 775
(9th Cir. 1962) ("safe practice" is to see that proba-
tioner "is furnished with counsel, if he does not have
it, and to give an opportunity for allocution").
91 People v. Valle, 7 Misc. 2d 125, 127, 164 N.Y.S.2d
67, 70-71 (Ct. Spec. Sess. App. Pt. 1957) (dictum);
cf. People ex red. Ambrose v. Combs, 33 Misc. 2d 360,
224 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
10 Jaime v. Rhay, 59 Wash. 2d 58, 365 P.2d 772
(1961).
'01 People v. Burrell, 334 Ill. App. 253, 79 N.E.2d
88 (1948); People v. Price, supra note 90, at 373, 164
N.E.2d at 534.
102 Crenshaw v. State, supra note 97, at 535, 161
A.2d at 671.
l1' Edwardsen v. State, 220 Md. 82, 89-90, 151
Parole
Here, again, we deal with cases decided by courts
of jurisdictions in which hearings are guaranteed
by statute.1 4
The most active court in the country in this
area is the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Under the provisions of the Federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act, the parolee whose parole has
been revoked and who has suffered reimprison-
ment may seek his release by habeas corpus or a
declaratory judgment action either from the
federal district court sitting in the district in which
he is confined or from the District of Columbia dis-
trict court. 0 5 Since, as will soon become apparent,
the construction of the federal parole revocation
statute, which directs that the retaken parolee
"shall be given an opportunity to appear before
the Board," is notably more liberal in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia than in other
federal circuits, reimprisoned parolees have sought
relief from the courts of the District.
The starting point for our discussion is Fleming
v. Tate,1 6 in which the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals construed the statute governing the
revocation of parole in the District of Columbia,
which is separate and apart from the federal parole
revocation statute.9 ' The court held in Fleming
that the parolee was entitled to be represented by
counsel of his own choice at the parole revocation
hearing.09 This decision was extended in Moore
A.2d 132, 136-37 (1959). One commentator refers to
an unreported case in Maryland in which counsel was
appointed for a probationer who claimed a mental de-
fect, which claim had some support in the evidence.
Mutter, Probation in the Criminal Court of Baltimore
City, 17 Mn. L. REv. 309, 321 n.61 (1957).
104 There are many cases from these jurisdictions,
however, which approve revocation of a conditional
pardon without a hearing if such a power was expressly
or impliedly reserved in the pardon. See Fuller v.
State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1899); Muckle v. Clark,
191 Ga. 202, 12 S.E.2d 339 (1940); Woodward v.
Murdock, 124 Ind. 439, 24 N.E. 1047 (1890); Boaz v.
A1 mrine, 153 Kan. 614, 113 P.2d 80 (1941); Silvey v.
Kaiser, 173 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 1943); Pope v. Wiggins,
220 Miss. 1, 69 So. 2d 913 (1954); In re Davenport,
110 Tex. Crim. 326, 7 S.W.2d 589 (1927); Scott v.
Callahan, 39 Wash. 2d 801, 239 P.2d 333 (1951).
Note also that in two jurisdictions, under earlier
statutes which did not require a hearing, revocation of
a parole without a hearing had been upheld against a
claim of unconstitutionality. Johnson v. Walls, 185
Ga. 177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937); In re Tabor, 173 Kan.
686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952).
101 Hurley v. Reed, 288 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
106 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
107 Cf. Cooper v. United States, 48 A.2d 771, 773
(D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1946).
108 The District of Columbia statute was amended
after Fleming to provide for representation of counsel.
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v. Re0d' 9 to impose upon the board the duty to
advise the parolee of his right to retain counsel.
In Robbins v. Reed" ° and, later, Glenn v. Reed,"
the holdings in Fleming and Moore on the right to
counsel were explicitly extended to revocations
ordered pursuant to the federal parole revocation
statute. In Reed v. Butterworth,"' the federal parole
board was ordered to allow the parolee to testify
in his own behalf, if he elects, and to present
voluntary witnesses.
The rights of the parolee, as recognized and en-
forced by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, apparently end at this point. For in
Hyser v. Reeam s the court, sitting en banc, held,
over a strong dissent, in a carefully structured
opinion that the parolee is not entitled (1) to
appointment of counsel, (2) to confront and cross-
examine persons who have imparted information
against him, (3) to examine reports made by the
parole officer and other members of the board's
staff, and (4) to the right to compulsory process to
secure witnesses.
Notwithstanding the decision in Hyser, the
federal parolee is better advised to seek his release
from the courts of the District of Columbia than
from federal courts outside the District. The
latter have construed the federal parole revocation
statute in a far more niggardly fashion. There is no
right to representation by retained counsel." 4
There is no right to produce voluntary witnesses," 5
although on this point the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit seems in disagreement." 6 And,
of course, there is no right to confrontation and
cross-examination." 7
109 246 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Ho 269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
111289 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
112 297 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
"1 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
14 Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949),
afJ'd by eqzadly divided court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950);
Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1960);
Lopez v. Madigan, 174 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1959);
Poole v. Stevens, 190 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Mich. 1960);
Hock v. Hagan, 190 F. Supp. 749 (M.D. Pa. 1960);
Gibson v. Markley, 205 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
However, as to current practice, see notes 128-130
infra.
11- Poole v. Stevens, supra note 114; United States
ex rel. McCreary v. Kenton, 190 F. Supp. 689 (D.
Conn. 1960) (but board enjoined "to give fair con-
sideration to what the prisoner [has] to say" and to
make "further investigation of sources of information
where warranted"); Gibson v. Markley, supra note
114. However, as to current practice, see note 131
infra.
H6 United States ex rel. Frederick v. Kenton, 308
F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1962).
117 Gibson v. Markley, supra note 114.
The courts of Delaware and Maryland have
held that the hearings guaranteed by their statutes
include the right to representation by counsel of
one's own choice,"' but not the right to have
counsel appointed by the board. In New Jersey,
where the statute makes the granting of a hearing
discretionary with the board, but guarantees
counsel of one's own "selection" if a hearing is, in
fact, held," 9 it has been decided that there is no
right to be advised of one's right to retain counsel,
at least where it is not shown "that counsel, if
present, could have done more than present to the
board the substantive point argued....",,0
In Delaware, the courts have further held that
the parolee must be given the opportunity to call
witnesses in his own behalf. 1" The Supreme Court
of Florida has ruled that the parolee is entitled to
be confronted by and meet the evidence against
him. "The Commission," the court wrote, "[has]
no right to treat as evidence material not intro-
duced as such or to consider any information out-
side the record in its disposition of the case."' m The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has reached a
different conclusion, holding that a hearing at
which the parolee was informed that the board
had evidence establishing the violation of six
different rules of his parole agreement. which evi-
dence was never produced, was adequate within
the terms of their statute. "[T]he only person
whom the Board is actually required to hear is the
parolee," the court explained. "All other informa-
tion and evidence may be brought to the attention
of the Board as a result of a report prepared by its
agents or employees."'m
11" State v. Boggs, 10 Terry (49 Del.) 277, 114 A.2d
663 (Super. Ct. 1955); Warden v. Palumbo, 214 Md.
407, 135 A.2d 439 (1957). Note that several statutes
confer on the parolee the right to retain counsel, while
some expressly deny him such a right. See category
VI of charts. Cases which are simply declarative of
statutes granting one or more rights to the parolee
(see, e.g., Petition of Vaughan, 124 N.W.2d 251 (Mich.
1963), holding that the parolee was not confronted
by adverse witnesses as required by the statute) are
not considered in this section.
"9 See note 5 to the charts, supra.
120 Jerabek v. State, 69 N.J. Super. 264, 174 A.2d
248 (1961).
"eState v. Boggs, supra note 118; Lockwood v.
Rhodes, 11 Terry (50 Del.) 287, 129 A.2d 549 (Super.
Ct. 1957).
12Jackson v. Mayo, 73 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. Sup.
Ct. 1954), relying in part, however, on the language
of the Florida statute. And cf. Senk v. Cochran, 116
So. 2d 245 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1959).
123 Hendrickson v. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Parole,
409 Pa. 204, 209, 185 A.2d 581, 585 (1962). Note that
the Pennsylvania statutes specifically authorize the
Board when revoking parole to act on reports "sub-
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The hearing which is held to revoke parole is
"informal" and is not governed by judicial rules
of procedure, "any more than the application of
these rules is necessary in many informal adminis-
trative hearings."lm
THE Cump-PN PRAcTicE
Hearings, as was observed early in this paper,
may be granted in practice although the right to a
hearing is denied by statute and case law. In at
least two jurisdictions in which the statutes do not
require a hearing on the revocation of parole-
Colorado and Connecticut-rules and regulations
promulgated by the board fill the gap. In Colo-
rado,.125 the parolee upon his return to the institu-
tion "shall be informed of the reason for the sus-
pension and of any grounds which have been
asserted for revocation of his parole and shall be
given an opportunity to be heard in regard there-
to." In Connecticut,2 6 the rules provide that upon
his return to prison the parolee shall be given
"reasonable notice of the charges against him...
[and] an opportunity to appear before the Board
at its next regular meeting at the State Prison to
admit, deny, or explain the violation charged."
These rules and regulations point up the practice,
generally prevailing, to hold parole revocation
hearings after the return of the parolee to the
institution from which he was paroled."n
The United States Board of Parole, influenced
perhaps by the trend of decisions in the District
of Columbia1 25 or by the fear that its present
mitted to them by their agents and employees ... "
PA. STATS. ANN. tit. 61, §331.22 (1962 Supp.).
12 Fleming v. Tate, supra note 106, at 849; and see
Hiatt v. Compagna, supra note 114; State v. Boggs,
supra note 118; Jackson v. Mayo, supra note 122;
Hendrickson v. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Parole,
supra note 123.
in Rules and Regulations of the State Board of
Parole, adopted December 11, 1958, at page 4 (sup-
plied to the writer by Edward W. Grout, Director of
Parole).
126 Rules and Regulations of the Board of Parole
for the State Prison, effective November 5, 1958, at
page 11 (supplied to the writer by James J. M'Ilduff,
Executive Secretary to the Board).
12 See parole statutes cited in categories IV and VI
of charts; cf. Martin v. Warden, 182 F. Supp. 391 (D.
Md. 1960), holding that reimprisonment prior to re-
ceiving the hearing guaranteed by the Maryland stat-
utes is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
,21 See discussion supra notes 105-113. In Reed v.
Butterworth, 297 F.2d 776, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1961), the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals criticized the
Earole board's apparent "notion... that revocation
earings are mere formalities, and the result a foregone
conclusion," which philosophy, the court believed, the
policy would not be favorably received by the
United States Supreme Court," 9 recently issued
two memorandums to all federal prisons.13
The first, dated April 24, 1961, allows the parolee,
not less than 30 days prior to the date of the
scheduled hearing, to elect on a suitable form to
retain counsel to represent him at the hearing. If
counsel makes an unscheduled appearance at the
hearing, and the parolee has no objections, counsel
will be permitted to attend the proceedings. The
board will not furnish counsel for the prisoner
unable to retain his own.
Under a memorandum dated November 30,
1961, the parolee may present voluntary witnesses
at the hearing. He signifies his desire to exercise
this right on a form provided by the prison. If
unscheduled witnesses appear at the hearing, and
the parolee elects, they will be permitted to appear
before the board and testify. 2'
The United States Parole Board has not changed
its policy of non-confrontation. In responding to
two questionnaires,132 James C. Neagles, Staff
Director, United States Board of Parole, indicated
that neither the parole officer nor persons who may
have given information against the parolee appear
at the hearing, and this is the case even if the
facts of the alleged violation are disputed by the
parolee. A written report is submitted to the
board by the parole authorities, which report is
board evidenced by denying parolees "fundamental
procedural safeguards."
329 See Note, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 737, 743-44 (1963).
,30 Both memorandums were furnished to the writer
by James C. Neagles, Staff Director, United States
Board of Parole, under letter dated January 10, 1962.
131 The claim has been made that the board has
virtually nullified the right to present "voluntary
witnesses" by choosing inappropriate places for the
hearing and refusing to pay the expenses of witnesses
who are willing to appear voluntarily. Note, supra
note 129, at 745.
132Two questionnaires were prepared by the writer
in December, 1961, and January, 1962, and were sent
to parole boards and probation departments through-
out the country. Fifty-two questionnaires were sent
to parole boards. Thirty-six, or 69%, were returned.
Second questionnaires were sent to 26 of the parole
boards which had responded to the first. These were
returned by 24, or 92%. Sixty-one questionnaires were
sent to probation departments. In 19 states which have
no centralized probation department, questionnaires
were sent to departments in the counties having the
greatest population. Fifty-five, or 90%, were returned.
Second questionnaires were sent to 49 probation de-
partments, and 44, or 90%, were returned. The ques-
tionnaires are reproduced and the replies from each
jurisdiction are individually charted in the writer's
unpublished thesis, The Revocation of Parole and
Adult Probation, May 1962 (Northwestern University
Law Library), at pages 12-18, 155-223.
19641
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not shown to the parolee or his counsel. Mr.
Neagles offered this reason for the board's pres-
ent policy of non-confrontation:
"To present an entire communication from
the parole officer to the parolee would tend to
damage the public informants who might have
contacted the parole officer to give information
regarding parole violations. It might'cause ulti-
mate repercussions to such persons as wives,
other family members and neighbors."' 33
State parole boards, responding to the writer's
two questionnaires, m indicated that hearings are
usually limited to an appearance by the parolee
before the board at which time he may explain,
admit, or deny the charges. 135 Witnesses against
the parolee rarely appear before the board, even if
the facts are disputed by the parolee."36 Instead,
the board relies on reports submitted by the parole
authorities. The reports generally are kept confi-
dential. The parolee rarely presents evidence or
witnesses, although most jurisdictions report
that such a right exists." The failure to exercise
this right is perhaps explained by the fact that in
Im Letter to the writer dated January 10, 1962.
The same point was made in a letter to the writer
dated December 21, 1961, from the Director of Pro-
bation and Parole in Maine, John J. Shea. Mr. Shea
observed:
"[Wihile a parole violator has certain rights and
while the State Board has certain obligations to the
violator in terms of substantiating the return to the
institution, the State Board also has a concurrent
responsibility to outside citizens in the community
whose safety and welfare might be jeopardized at a
later date through any vengeful act by the violator
after his release from the institution .... Therefore,
the State Board may discuss with the parole violator
at time of parole violation hearing only a sufficient
number of items to substantiate the fact that the
man is in violation of parole."
And see In re Varner, 166 Ohio St. 340, 142 N.E.2d
846 (1957), discussed supra note 52.
a5 See note 132 supra.
135 Responses from Iowa, Nevada, South Dakota,
and Vermont indicated that hearings are not ordinarily
held in these states.
136 Ohio and Pennsylvania, amplifying answers on
the questionnaires, reported that no outsiders are per-
mitted at the hearing, Pennsylvania adding that "We
use a format similar to that used in Military Court
Martial procedures ...." South Carolina and Hawaii
indicated, however, that the parole officer will attend
the hearing. This is probably the case in other juris-
dictions as well.
131 Louisiana, Maryland, and Virginia reported, how-
ever, that the parolee's witnesses will be heard at the
board's offices, out of the parolee's presence. Georgia
and Utah noted that whether the parolee's witnesses
will testify in his presence will depend upon the "na-
ture" or "circumstances" of the case. The writer be-
lieves that such may be the rule in many other juris-
dictions which signified, without amplification, that
the parolee may present his own witnesses.
most cases, according to some of the parole boards
responding, the parolee has been convicted of a new
crime while on parole or has admitted the charges
against him.'38 About half of the jurisdictions
reporting indicated that the parolee may retain
counsel if he wishes. Significantly, however, several
jurisdictions pointed out that counsel, if retained,
may present arguments on behalf of the parolee
at the board's offices and not at the hearing." 9
Three jurisdictions indicated that the parolee
"seldom" retains counsel. 40 No jurisdiction indi-
cated that it would assign counsel for the parolee.
Notice of the charges is ordinarily given to the
parolee at some time before the hearing, either
upon arrest or in an interview by a parole official
at the prison. However, in a few jurisdictions, the
charges are not made known to the parolee until
the actual hearing. 4'
Probation revocation hearings, being held in
court, tend to be more judicial or formal in nature
than parole revocation hearings.'4 This is not the
case in every jurisdiction, however. Louis B.
Sharp, Chief, Probation Division, Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, commenting on
the hearing procedures in the federal courts, re-
ported that the probation officer ordinarily testi-
fies at the hearing and a written report is sub-
mitted to the court. The report is not shown to the
probationer. Witnesses against the probationer
usually do not appear in court, even if the facts
are disputed. If witnesses are produced by the
probation authorities, the probationer may not
cross-examine them as of right, but "may with
permission of the court." He may not present evi-
dence or witnesses "as a general rule." Retained
counsel is not permitted at the hearing. Counsel
will not be assigned. Notice of the charges is "gen-
erally" given "at the time of arrest" and "prior to
the hearing."
According to responses received from state and
138 Louisiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont,
and Washington specially reported that cases are rare
where the violation charged is not supported by a con
viction or admitted by the parolee.
139 Louisiana, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia
noted this by way of amplifying their responses to the
questionnaires.
1 Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin.
141 This appears to be the case in Maryland and
Ohio. Notice of the charges in the District of Columbia
is given to the parolee prior to the hearing "if repre-
sented by counsel." Otherwise, the "specifications are
read to [the parolee] at the opening of the hearing."
M Note that the statutes in Florida and New Mexico
set up a "pleading" procedure somewhat similar to
procedure in criminal trials. See category VI of charts.
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county probation departments, the probation
officer is often the sole witness against the proba-
tioner. Witnesses against the probationer generally
are produced if the facts are disputed by the proba-
tioner. Factual disputes, however, are not the
rule, since in most cases the probationer has ad-
mitted the essential charges or the violation is
supported by a judgment of conviction."' Several
jurisdictions emphasized the trial court's power to
order witnesses produced if he believes the case
demands it.'" When witnesses do appear, the pro-
bationer or his counsel, as a general rule, may
cross-examine them."' Written reports are sub-
mitted to the court in the vast majority of juris-
dictions. Roughly one-third of the jurisdictions
responding indicated that the report is shown to
the probationer or his counsel "on request." Re-
tained counsel may represent the probationer at
the hearing, and evidence and witnesses may be
produced on his behalf, in almost all of the juris-
dictions reporting on their procedures.14 Again,
however, the frequency of cases in which the
charges are either admitted or substantiated by a
judgment of conviction may, as a practical matter,
obviate the need for presenting evidence and wit-
nesses. Slightly better than half the jurisdictions
reporting indicated that the court will assign
counsel for the indigent probationer who desires
counsel. Notice of the charges against him is
generally given to the probationer on or soon after
his arrest and is repeated at the hearing.
'3This point was specially noted in the responses
received from the statewide probation departments of
Massachusetts, Utah, and Washington and those of
Los Angeles and San Diego counties in California. It
also appears to be the case in New York. See Note,
59 COLum. L. Rv. 311, 322 (1959). The probation
department in Marion County (Indianapolis), Indiana
indicated that probation is normally revoked for fail-
ure to pay lines or costs, or failure to report to the
probation officer, in which case the judge will "rely
on the officer's word."
"'The statewide probation departments in North
Carolina and Vermont so indicated, as well as the
probation departments of Baltimore City, Maryland,
Hennepin (Minneapolis) and Ramsey (St. Paul) coun-
ties in Minnesota, Essex County (Newark) in New
Jersey, Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, and Mil-
waukee County, Wisconsin.
" Here, again, the trial court has discretion to
determine whether or not cross-examination should
be permitted and to what extent. The statewide pro-
bation departments of Missouri, Vermont, and Wash-
ington and the federal probation department made
this point.
"' A notable exception appears to be the federal
courts, as already pointed out.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The Constitutional Issues
The constitutional issues imbedded in the area
have been thoroughly canvassed elsewhere. The
pros and cons of whether due process requires a
fair hearing before probation or parole may be
revoked have been explored in the law reviews, 47
in a recent multi-opinioned decision of the Courts
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, sitting
en bana for the occasion,4 and by this writer in
his unpublished thesis,' and need not be further
explored here. Suffice it to say that the hardiest
of the arguments against the due process claim-
perhaps because it twice has been articulated by
the United States Supreme Court"'0-is that pro-
bation and parole are "privileges" and not "legal
rights" and, hence, may be withdrawn in any
manner the granting authority chooses. This has
been undercut by recent decisions of the Supreme
Court in the field of public employment. These
decisions stress harm-whether the "govern-
mental action seriously injures an individual"' L --
and refuse to allow the frozen terms "privilege"
and "right" to be decisive on the issue of pro-
cedural fairness."'l They also point out that sub-
'" Weihofen, Revoking Probation, Parole or Pardon
Without a Hearing, 32 J. Cant. L. & C. 531 (1942);
Hink, Application of Constitutional Standards of Pro-
tection to Probation, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 483 (1962);
Note, 65 HARV. L. REv. 309 (1951); Note, 59 CoLAt.
L. Rxv. 311 (1959); Note 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 737
(1963).48 Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
9 Sklar, The Revocation of Parole and Adult Pro-
bation, 226-45, May 1962 (unpublished thesis in
Northwestern University Law Library).
150 Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932);
Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
1 "Certain principles have remained relatively im-
mutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that
where governmental action seriously injures an indi-
vidual, and the reasonableness of the action depends
on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the
Government's case must be disclosed to the individual
so that he has an opportunity to show that it is un-
true." Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97
(1959). See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-96 (1961); cf. Hannah
v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440-44 (1960); Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 364-65 nn. 17 &
18 (1963).
' Cases supra note 151. In Green v. McElroy, the
security clearance of an aeronautical engineer was re-
voked after a hearing at which he was denied access
to much of the evidence against him and had no op-
portunity to confront or cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses. As a result of the revocation he lost his job
with a private manufacturer doing classified govern-
ment work and was unable afterwards to secure similar
employment. The revocation order was reversed by
the Court, but on non-constitutional grounds. 360
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stantial interests, even if denominated "privi-
leges," cannot be taken from an individual through
arbitrary governmental action."' This, it will be
recalled, was the position taken by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in re-
gard to revocation of a conditional pardon without
a hearing.1M
U.S. at 508. In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy, the Court held that the revocation
of a security clearance permit without notice or a hear-
ing, resulting in the discharge of a short-order cook
from a military installation, was not violative of due
process. Restaurant Workers, it has been said, under-
scores "the relatively narrow thrust of the Greene
holding." Hyser v. Reed, supra note 148, at 239. On
the contrary, however, the Restaurant Workers case
underscores and strengthens the true thrust of the
holding in Greene v. McElroy, for, as compared to the
employment loss suffered by Greene, the employee
in Restaurant Workers lost only the opportunity to
work as a short-order cook "at one isolated and spe-
cific military installation." 367 U.S. at 896. See Willner
v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96,
103 n.2 (1963); Williams v. Zuckert, 371 U.S. 531,
534 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas).
Such a loss does not come within the sweep of the
phrase "serious injury."
Unfortunately, however, the concept of "privileges"
and "rights" lingers on in the opinions. See Jay v.
Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956), suspension of deportation
being an "act of grace," an application for same may
be denied on "confidential information"; note the anal-
ogy to probation in the majority opinion (at p. 354)
and the treatment of the majority's analogy in Justice
Black's dissenting opinion (at pp. 366-67); Willner v.
Committee on Character & Fitness, supra, at 102,
person cannot be excluded from the practice of law
without an opportunity to confront and cross-examine
those who give information against him-practice of
law "is not 'a matter of grace and favor.'" And cf.
the use of the term "legal rights" in Hannah v. Larche,
supra note 151, at 441-42.
15 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952);
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S.
551 (1956); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v.
McElroy, supra note 151, at 894, 897-98; Cramp v.
Board of Public Education, 368 U.S. 278, 288 (1961);
cf. Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1963).
15 Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir.
1941), discussed supra notes 78-80. Accord, State ex
rd. Murray v. Swenson, 196 Md. 222, 76 A.2d 150
(1950), discussed supra note 80. The United States
Supreme Court has said in this connection: "While
probation is a matter of grace, the probationer is en-
titled to fair treatment, and is not to be made the
victim of whim or caprice." Burns v. United States,
supra note 150, at 223. However, aside from the
question whether or not the Burns Court was only re-
ferring to the probationer's rights under the federal
statute (see Escoe v. Zerbst, supra note 150, at 492-
93), it is probable that when the Court spoke of pro-
tecting the probationer against "whim and caprice"
it had in mind revocation on patently inadequate
grounds and not revocation without a hearing. 287
U.S. at 223-24. Moreover, it seems equally probable
that the "public employment" cases, cited supra note
153, when they admonish that "privileges" may not
be taken away "arbitrarily," are referring more to
Policy Cotsideralions Against Granting a Full
Hearing
Constitutional issues, especially weighty Four-
teenth Amendment problems, while demanding
and being entitled to careful attention, often retard
mature deliberation on policy considerations of
great practical import. The question whether hear-
ings should be granted before probation or parole is
revoked involves such policy considerations.
Absolute denial of a hearing has been justified
on the policy ground that hearings would result in
increased burdens of administration on the courts
and parole boards and undoubtedly would dis-
courage them from granting probations or paroles
they otherwise would grant. 5' The same argument
has been offered as a basis for severely limiting the
scope and extent of a hearing required by statute."6
There is no evidence that such expectations have
materialized in jurisdictions where fuller hearings
are mandated. 15 Indeed, knowledge that a hearing
is needed before conditional release can be revoked
may have the beneficial effect of compelling the
granting authority to exercise greater care in se-
lecting worthy candidates for rehabilitation.
A forceful answer to this policy argument is
found in an opinion of the Utah Supreme Court:
"It has been suggested that [the necessity of a
hearing] may cause the trial courts to deny any
stay of execution because of the complications
involved even in cases where the public interest
requires probation. We see no merit to this con-
tention. It suggests that courts, in order to exer-
cise arbitrary and capricious power, will violate
their oath of office and their duty to the public.
Why should any honest judge adopt such a
policy? The very suggestion shows a lack of con-
non-existent or irrational grounds than non-existent
procedure. See Cafereria & Restaurant Workers Union
v. McElroy, supra note 151, at 897-98. This is not to
say, of course, that the position taken in Fleenor v.
Hammond, supra, has been discredited. Logic, as well
as language in the opinions, support it, at least in a
case where probation or parole is revoked without an
adequate hearing for conduct which is neither admitted
nor substantiated by uncontrovertable proof. See notes
173-181 infra, and accompanying text.
155 In re Varner, 166 Ohio St. 340, 345, 142 N.E.2d
846, 849 (1957).
156 Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 222 (1932).
15 In fact, it has been observed that Michigan, where
the statute grants an unusually full and complete hear-
ing before parole is revoked (see chart VI), "has one of
the highest proportions of parole grants." Davies &
Hess, Criminal Law-Insane Persons-Influence of
Mental Illness on the Parole Return Process, 59 MIcH.
L. REv. 1101, 1110 n.47 (1961).
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fidence in the integrity of our courts, which we
do not share."1' s
The next two policy considerations relate to the
question of confrontation by adverse witnesses.
The United States Parole Board has maintained
that "to require [parole officers] to appear at hun-
dreds of revocation hearings annually, convened in
many instances at places distant from areas under
their supervision, would render it impossible for
them to carry on their normal duties."'6 3 How-
ever, it is probable that the board has exaggerated
the burden to the parole officer. Parole officers
would be required witnesses only if they had per-
sonal knowledge of the facts of the violation
charged. They would generally have such knowl-
edge, in turn, only where the charges constitute
technical or non-criminal violations of the terms
of the parole agreement. Where the charges
amount to criminal offenses, and this is fre-
quently the case, the logical witnesses would be
police officers and private citizens. Furthermore,
the board could alleviate this problem by schedul-
ing the hearings at the place of the parolee's initial
confinement rather than at the federal peniten-
tiary to which he was returned.16 Finally, even if
this policy consideration is not without some
merit,61 the problem posed by the board is one
faced by all law enforcement agencies, which are
thus forced to "provide enough skilled men to
allow for the presence of some of their number in
court."
16 2
The third policy consideration, and one that
I' McPhie v. Turner, 10 Utah 2d 237, 240, 351
P.2d 91, 93 (1960). A requirement that a violation
charged be proved by a degree of proof approaching
that demanded in criminal cases justifiably might make
courts and parole boards reluctant to grant probation
and parole even in deserving cases. Campbell v. Ader-
hold, 36 F.2d 366, 367 (N.D. Ga. 1929). This, clearly,
is a different matter. It is avoided by recognizing in
the revoking authority a broad discretion to revoke
whenever it is reasonably satisfied that the best inter-
ests of the public and the offender are no longer being
served by his conditional liberty. Evidence that a new
crime has been committed is unnecessary. E.g., Camp-
bell v. Aderhold, supra; Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225,
242 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Swan v. State, 200 Md. 420,
90 A.2d 690 (1952); Sellers v. State, 105 Neb. 748,
181 N.W. 862 (1921). See generally Note, 59 CoLm.
L. REv. 311, 332-33 (1959).
1'Brief for Appellees, p. 47, Neiswenter v. Chappell,
318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963), quoted in Note, 57
Nw. U.L. REv. 737, 754 (1963). The readier accessi-
bility of courts makes this argument less persuasive
in the area of probation revocation.
101 The latter is the current practice of the board.
See Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
161 See Note, supra note 158, at 754.
162 Ibid.
was verbalized in letters received by the writer
from the federal parole board and the Maine
board,. 1 relates to the danger of reprisal. Requir-
ing adverse witnesses to confront the probationer
or parolee or turning the violation report over to
him for perusal, it is maintained, may endanger
the safety of the informants. Witnesses fearing re-
prisal may be reluctant to come forward and give
information against the violator if. they know this
information will not remain secretY.1 4 Such a
"danger," of course, exists as well in the trial of a
criminal case, but it has never been seriously ad-
vanced there. It is dearly outbalanced by greater
and more compelling considerations. The question
is whether the balance in a revocation hearing
should be struck in favor of secrecy. Into this
balance must be thrown the danger of misguided,
faulty, or biased information. The "faceless in-
former," who may peddle his rumors, but escape
the ordeal of confrontation and cross-examination,
is abhorrent to the Anglo-American sense of jus-
tice. True, some witnesses, fearing reprisal, may be
unwilling to impart information if they know their
identity will not be kept secret. However, the rea-
son for this unwillingness, it seems to this writer, is
just as, if not more likely to be, attributable to
fear that the information they have will not with-
stand the test of cross-examination, as to fear of
reprisal. No public policy is served by encouraging
persons to come forward with information of this
nature.1
A fourth policy argument is waged against allow-
ing retained counsel to attend the informal hear-
ings before the parole board. Counsel, it is argued,
"would convert the hearing into a legal battle."
163 See note 133 supra.
164 This point is also made in the cases. See In re
Varner, supra note 155; State ex rel. McQueen v.
Horton, 31 Ala. App. 71, 76, 14 So. 2d 557, 560, aF'd,
244 Ala. 594, 14 So. 2d 561 (1943).
165 "Faceless informers," it has properly been writ-
ten, "are often effective if they need not take the
stand." Justice Douglas dissenting in Beard v. Stahr,
370 U.S. 41, 43 (19625. Moreover, if the informer
justly needs protection, his identity should be kept
secret. At the same time, however, his information
should not be used as a means of depriving another of
his liberty. If secrecy and revocation cannot be ac-
complished at the same time, revocation should not
be ordered. The revoking authority must make a
choice; either reveal its information and allow it to
be tested fairly, or justify its order of revocation with-
out resort in any way to the information suppressed.
To put it another way, the revoking authority must
support its disposition of the case on the basis of facts
developed at the hearing. Jackson v. Mayo, 73 So. 2d
881 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1954); cf. Jencks v. United States,
353 U.S. 657, 671-72 (1957).
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The issues at a revocation hearing-whether the
parolee's conduct demonstrates that he is no
longer a good parole risk-are not issues for which
counsel is necessary or desirable. "It is difficult for
us," one state parole board communicated to the
writer, "to visualize how counsel can make a
worthwhile contribution ... at a parole violation
hearing."'' 1 The answer to these contentions was
supplied by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia:
"The presence of counsel does not mean that
he may take over control of the proceeding. The
receipt of testimony offered by the prisoner need
not be governed by the strict rules of evidence,
any more than the application of those rules is
necessary in many informal administrative
hearings .... The participation by counsel in a
proceeding such as this need be not greater than
is necessary to insure, to the Board as well as to
the parolee, that the Board is accurately in-
formed from the parolee's standpoint before it
acts, and the permitted presentation of testi-
mony by the parolee need be no greater than is
necessary for the same purpose.... The pres-
ence of counsel is meant as a measure of protec-
tion to the prisoner; it should not be permitted
to become a measure of embarrassment to the
tribunal. ,,""'
Policy Considerations for Granting a Fdl Hearing
Policy considerations are not lacking on the side
of granting a full and fair hearing. Probation and
parole have as their sole purpose rehabilitation of
the offender. The conditionally released offender,
simply from the fact of release, has been deemed
by the granting authority a proper subject for re-
habilitation and has been given his liberty on con-
dition that he follow a course of good behavior. He
has thereby attained "a favored status." "He
should be able to rely upon the representation that
if he measures up to his responsibilities, he will not
have his liberty taken from him capriciously nor
arbitrarily."168
Furthermore, the purpose of the revocation hear-
ing itself, one court has observed, "is as much to
form a part of the rehabilitation process as to
provide a check on the administrative decision,
'6 Letter dated December 21, 1961, from John J.
Shea, Director of Probation and Parole in Maine.
1- Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848, 849-50 (D.C.
Cir. 1946).
1ll Baine v. Bechstead, 10 Utah 2d 4, 9, 347 P.2d
554, 558 (1959).
already tentatively made, that the conditions of
release were violated."'68 Reformation, in turn, can
"certainly best be accomplished by fair, consistent
and straightforward treatment of the person
sought to be reformed."'7 0 Although it would be
to some extent engaging in speculation to maintain
that the process of rehabilitating conditionally
released prisoners is aided by their knowledge
that they will receive a hearing should they be
charged with violating the conditions of their
release, the effect of revocation without a hearing
upon future attempts at rehabilitation seems clear.
A person who feels that he did not receive fair
treatment at the hands of the revoking authority
more than likely would become a difficult subject
for any future reformation. Having made what he
might consider an honest attempt to perform the
conditions of his release, and having been im-
prisoned without an opportunity to answer his
accusers and fairly to present his version of the
facts of the alleged violation to the authorities, it
is quite conceivable that he might develop "a
feeling that he is [being] picked on or abused by
society."'
7'
Such considerations "rather argue the advisa-
bility of being careful, not only to treat him
fairly, but in such manner that he will see the fair-
ness of it."''
Several other policy grounds for granting a full
hearing were suggested in the Attorney General's
1939 Survey of Release Procedures. Written in
connection with parole, they apply equally to
probation.
"[The possibility exists that the parole agent
was over-hasty in his action in returning the
parolee as a violator. Parole agents are human,
and it is possible that friction between the agent
and parolee may have influenced the agent's
judgment. In fairness to the violator, this is a
possibility which should be investigated by some
higher authority....
"Another reason for holding a hearing is that
often the true psychology of the parolee prece-
dent to the commission of the violation is re-
vealed. The trend of the parolee's thought in
trying to rationalize his behavior may afford
169 Hendrickson v. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Parole,
409 Pa. 204, 207, 185 A.2d 581, 584 (1962).
170 State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 303, 259 Pac.
1044, 1046 (1927). See, also, Escoe v. Zerbst, 295
U.S. 490, 493-94 (1935).
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clues to his mental and emotional make-up
which will be useful in effecting his future ad-
justment in society.
"Third, the hearing is an opportunity for the
violator to discuss his behavior and to have it
analyzed by men who, by virtue of the position
they occupy, necessarily have an interest in his
future behavior. If, through his own statements,
a parole violator can be made to see how irra-
tionally he has acted,... a long step toward his
ultimate rehabilitation may have been taken." '
NEcEssITY OF A HEARING WHEN
"FAcTuAL DisPuTE" ExISTS
Vhen the reasonableness of governmental action
which seriously injures an individual "depends on
fact findings," the United States Supreme Court
has said, the individual is entitled to a hearing at
which he may test the truthfulness of the evidence
against him and offer his own proof in rebuttal.'
The presence of a genuine factual dispute when
the revocation of probation or parole is sought
mandates such a hearing-one that includes reas-
onable notice of the precise charges, the right to
present evidence and witnesses, the right to retain
one's own counsel, and the vital elements of con-
frontation and cross-examination. 175 Such h6arings
1734 ATToRNEY GENERAL'S SURvEY OF RELEASE
PRocEDuRus 246-47 (1939).
17 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959);
cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 249-50
(1949). See generally 1 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§§ 7.01, 7.02, 7.04, 7.05 (1958).
- The Model Penal Code, §301.4, recommends that
probation not be revoked except after a hearing em-
bracing each of these elements. These elements are
traditionally associated with a procedurally fair hear-
ing under due process. E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 68-70 (1932); Morgan v. United States, 304
U.S. 1, 18 (1938); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
On the question of the right to assigned counsel,
see Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Note, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 737, 758-60 (1963), both re-
lating to the right to assigned counsel at the parole
revocation proceeding. Neither probation nor parole
revocation hearings can properly be termed "criminal
prosecutions." E.g. Bums v. United States, 287 U.S.
216 (1932); In re Levi, 39 Cal. 2d 41, 244 P.2d 403
(1952); People v. Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 138 N.W.
1044 (1912); Jaime v. Rhay, 59 Wash. 2d 58, 365
P.2d 772 (1961). It would seem to follow that a right
to assigned counsel cannot be based either on the
Sixth Amendment or the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, the United States
Supreme Court recently held in Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963), that counsel must be appointed
on appeal from a criminal conviction, otherwise the
indigent defendant is discriminated against because of
his indigency. Thus, in jurisdictions where paid-for
counsel is allowed to appear at the revocation hearing,
either under statute or case law, a strong argument
would not unduly hamper the administration of
probation and parole. The number of cases in which
a dispute as to material facts exists is relatively
small 7 6
If the probationer or parolee has admitted the
truth of the allegations against him, or if the viola-
tion has been proved by a judgment of conviction,
there is no genuine or material issue of fact, and a
hearing with a full panoply of rights is unneces-
sary. This point has been recognized time and
again in the decisions' 77 and is recognized in the
statutes of several states.'7 The only question for
determination by the revoking authority in such a
case is whether the admitted or proved conduct
requires the severe sanction of revocation or
whether the violator's conditional liberty should
nevertheless be continued with or without modifi-
cation. This is a policy determination. It may be
decided without hearing evidence. The hearing
granted need extend no further than affording the
violator a chance to explain his conduct 79 Such a
hearing, although limited, would be "appropriate
to the nature of the case."" 80
Denial of a procedurally fair hearing in the few
cases where genuine factual issues exist is "arbi-
trary governmental action."' 8' None of the policy
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment can be made for extending the right to
probationers or parolees who are unable to provide
their own legal assistance. Hyser v. Reed, supra, at
255 (dissenting opinion of Bazelon and Edgerton,
JJ.); Note, supra, at 758-59.
17 See notes 138 and 143 supra, and accompanying
text.
17 Hearings have been denied or severely restricted
in such cases. See Hyser v. Reed, supra note 174
(dissenting opinion of Bazelon and Edgerton, JJ.);
Whitehead v. United States, 155 F.2d 460 (6th Cir.
1946); Bennett v. United States, 158 F.2d 412 (8th
Cir. 1946); Buhler v. Pescor, 63 F. Supp. 632, 639
(W.D. Mo. 1945); Hulse v. Pescor, 17 Alaska 353,
359-60 (1957); People v. Burrell, 334 Ill. App. 253,
79 N.E.2d 88 (1948); In re Carpenter, 348 Mich. 408,
83 N.W.2d 326 (1957); State v. Zachowski, 53 N.J.
Super. 431, 440, 441, 147 A.2d 584, 589, 590 (1959)
(a particularly illuminating opinion); Baine v. Beck-
stead, 10 Utah 2d 4, 347 P.2d 554 (1959).
17" In the probation revocation field: Kentucky, see
chart III, Florida and New Mexico, see chart VI; in
the parole revocation field: Hawaii and Pennsylvania,
see chart IV, Georgia, Michigan, and Washington, see
chart VI.
'l Hyser v. Reed, supra note 174, at 247; Bayken v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 322 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
1963); Note, 59 CoLTrm. L. REV. 311, 322-23 (1959).
in See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Hannah v. Larche, 363
U.S. 420, 440-42 (1960).
181 Greene v. McElroy, supra note 173, at 496-99,
508. "It is not without significance that most of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural. It is
1964]
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considerations inveighing against a hearing can
justify depriving the probationer or parolee of his
conditional liberty on the basis of untested fact
findings arguably open to dispute. Only a hearing
at which the proof against the alleged violator is
introduced in his presence and, in the case of wit-
nesses, subjected to the antiseptic test of cross-
examination, and at which countervailing proof
may be produced, can fairly be said to satisfy the
needs of the situation.M Aside from the demands of
procedure that spells much of the difference between
rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast
adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main
assurance that there will be equal justice under law."
Justice Douglas, concurring, in Joint Anti-Fascist Ref-
ugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951).
182 Contrary to expressions in some of the opinions
(e.g., In re Anderson, 191 Ore. 409, 424, 229 P.2d
633, 640 (1951); McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407,
413, 160 P.2d 721, 723 (1945)), there should not be
any distinction drawn between probation and parole
insofar as hearing procedures are concerned because
one is judicial in nature and the other is an adminis-
justice and fairness framed in the Fourteenth
Amendment, the orderly and proper administra-
tion of our penological system demands no less.
trative determination. Both have the same purpose-
rehabilitation of the offender-and both involve the
same factual questions and determinations. See Baine
v. Beckstead, 10 Utah 2d 4, 9, 347 P.2d 554, 558
(1959). When an administrative agency makes a bind-
ing factual adjudication directly affecting substantial
interests of an individual--as does the parole board
in revocation matters--"it is imperative that those
agencies use the procedures which have traditionally
been associated with the judicial process." Hannah v.
Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). These procedures
embrace "not only the right to present evidence, but
also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of
the opposing party and to meet them." Morgan v.
United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14-15, 18 (1938); Londoner
v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908); Greene v. Mc-
Elroy, supra note 173, at 496-97. The administrative
hearing, of course, may be less formal than a judicial
proceeding. Londoner v. Denver, supra. For example,
the atmosphere may be more relaxed. 1 DAvIs, AD-
mINsTRATIV LAW §8.13 (1958). Technical rules of
evidence are more or less inapplicable. 2 id. §§ 14.01,
14.06.
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